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Abstract
Extrapolating from modern international understanding of corporate Japan’s dis-
tinct form of managerial capitalism, we elaborate on the growing momentum of 
shareholder activism in Japan leading up to the COVID-19 health crisis, so as to 
inform the subsequent discussion on the relevant primary considerations that belie 
the future direction of shareholder activism in Japan post-COVID-19. On an initial 
logical extrapolation, it appears probable that COVID-19 could mark the peak of 
Japanese activism. However, it is crucial to acknowledge that the success of Japan’s 
managerial capitalism have also declined, which poses a question on to which direc-
tion Japanese corporate governance may be shifting. Finally, we point out how cor-
porate Japan’s impeding market developments will provide a useful case-study for 
global financial discourse.
Keywords Japanese firms · Shareholder activism · Corporate governance · 
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Introduction
The COVID-19 health crisis has catalyzed a demand-side, real economy-led eco-
nomic downturn, throwing financial markets around the world into a period of 
considerable uncertainty and volatility. Equity capital markets are not exempt, 
and shareholder activists’ ability to shrewdly navigate the turbulent storm will be 
tested. We canvas the corporate terrain leading up to the COVID-19 health crisis, 
and then present some considerations from both the outside investor’s perspective 
and the corporate insider’s perspective. Finally, we discuss a possible direction of 
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shareholder activism in Japan and the future Japanese market-sensitivity to interna-
tional corporate governance norms.
Pre‑COVID‑19 shareholder activism expansion
Prior to COVID-19, there was an almost unanimous acknowledgement of the tre-
mendous momentum behind shareholder activism (both confrontational and quiet), 
as an expression of shareholder primacy, in Japan (Buchanan et al. 2012). This is 
unsurprising given the abundance of public companies with solid performance, 
undervalued stock prices, excess cash reserves, vulnerable capital policies and often 
insulated management. In 2019, Japan was the most-targeted non-US jurisdiction, 
with local records of 19 activist campaigns, $4.5 billion in capital deployed, 58 pub-
lic companies targeted, 22 shareholder demands for board representation and 14 
proxy fights (Activist Insight 2020).
As observed by many researchers (e.g., Ahmadjian and Robins 2005; Yoshikawa 
and McGuire 2008), incremental convergence between Japan’s insider or stake-
holder-oriented corporate governance system and Anglo-American shareholder-cen-
tric model had been occurring slowly but surely, partially catalyzed by the bubble 
economy collapse and the globalization of capital markets. Per the reflexive nature 
of market development, the growing success of early shareholder activists, coupled 
with attendant legal and regulatory developments, laid the groundwork for the cur-
rent boom in Japanese shareholder activism, prominently led by Paul Singer’s Elli-
ott Management, Daniel Loeb’s Third Point Management and Yoshiaki Murakami-
related parties. The movement was further buttressed by Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe’s corporate governance reform initiatives through the Stewardship Code and 
Corporate Governance Code. Nonetheless, certain crucial structural impediments 
remained, pushing back against complete convergence.
First, the complex corporate governance situation stemming from Japanese firms’ 
unique capital structures must be appreciated. A byproduct of its war-era, bank-
based economy, cross-shareholdings among affiliated firms meant that a portion of 
a public company’s shares would be held by the company’s banks, customers, sup-
pliers, and other friendly partners. This leads to a structural conflict of interest, since 
such stable shareholders wearing two hats would often prioritize ongoing business 
relationships and stable business ties over high investment returns, decreasing pres-
sure on firm’s profit performance and cash returns (via dividends or share buybacks) 
and reinforcing managerial independence (Yoshikawa and McGuire 2008).
Second, as discussed by many observers (e.g., Ahmadjian and Robins 2005), 
group-focused loyalties and identities persist in corporate Japan’s mental universe, 
leading to a stakeholder-oriented model. Though cracks had begun to emerge with 
the increasing acceptance of shareholder value maximization rhetoric, certain set-
backs to the activist momentum (e.g., Murakami’s 2006 arrest for insider trading) 
potentially offered a rare glimpse into Japan, Inc.’s closing ranks. This cultural bias 
has translated into a practical constrain on the usual activist strategies seen in more 
divisive equity capital markets like the US.
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Thus, pre-COVID-19, corporate Japan was undergoing a transitionary period that 
was potentially a crucial determinant of Japan’s future corporate governance norms.
Post‑COVID‑19 managerial capitalism resurgence?
The COVID-19 health crisis could not have come at a worse time. Deep-rooted cul-
tural change requires time for truly lasting cracks to cement, and this pandemic-cata-
lyzed economic downturn looks to stop the winds in the activists’ sails. Momentum, 
once lost, can be hard to regain.
No doubt, for certain ongoing high-stake corporate tussles (e.g., Softbank and 
Elliott Management), the concurrent decline in real economy performance and 
liquidity will bring tensions to a head. But for the vast majority of activist actions, 
the heightened volatility and economic uncertainty will pose drastic challenges 
(Gottfried and Donahue 2020), notwithstanding increased opportunities from low-
ered valuations (TOPIX 500 plunged 31% from 52-week highs, similar to S&P 
500’s 35% plunge from 52-week highs) and potential target firm vulnerability due to 
relatively weaker shareholder rights plans (Koh et al. 2019).
First, the inherent nature of this real economy-led economic downturn means 
that firm preservation, not shareholder value maximization (since cash distributions 
adversely impact a firm’s liquidity), will be at the forefront of companies’ periph-
eries. Japan’s unique capital structure of cross-shareholdings and stable sharehold-
ings will only exacerbate such concerns, since a proportion of the listed company’s 
shareholders will have the exact same skin in the game. Therefore, such conflicted 
shareholders may lend immediate managerial support now, in hopes that it may lead 
to reciprocal support. As such, shareholder activists may soon find that the support 
they can count on (e.g., domestic institutions) in proxy fights are now diminished 
during this period, as management distraction concerns and further instability exac-
erbation outweigh any potential benefits. Second, on the ideological front, usual 
activists’ inefficiency arguments against cash-hoarders during prosperous times will 
now be poignantly countered with the raw experience of resiliency during these tur-
bulent times (Lewis 2020).
Conclusion
On a micro-scale, there is no doubt that COVID-19 has the real potential to represent 
the inflection point for shareholder activism in Japan, as market mood turns against 
corporate outsiders. But whether this subsequently manifests in reality depends much 
on the surrounding circumstances that prevail long past COVID-19. First, given the fact 
that the Japanese market has long matured, and growth opportunities are increasingly 
scarce, the viability and sustainability of Japan’s managerial capitalism may simply no 
longer hold true. Capital inefficiency due to managerial preference to lock in capital 
within the firm will generate ever-increasing agency costs. Second, the post-war-era 
agency cost hedges no longer operate to the same extent. For example, the economic 
incentive systems (lifetime employment, seniority-based wages) designed to align man-
agerial interests within the company have eroded over time (Yoshikawa and McGuire 
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2008), coupled with ever-increasing reliance on temporary workers, as a creative adap-
tation of Japan’s existing employment institutions, to cope with greater market pres-
sures. Thus, the short-term inefficiencies of managerial capitalism may no longer pro-
duce long-term economic growth (to the same extent) given the modern circumstances 
of Japan’s economy.
On a macro-scale, the corporate discussions to follow provide an interesting case-
study for global discourse. The current hot potato in the financial realm surrounds 
the proper primary purpose of a company: should it be a purely profit-seeking pri-
vate entity or should it resemble quasi-public entities focused on broader stakeholder 
considerations and thus indirectly, economic growth? The COVID-19 aftermath will 
produce unique invaluable research domain to better discern the resiliency of Japan’s 
stakeholder-model economy (e.g., the number of Japanese corporate insolvencies vis-à-
vis the U.S.) and thus contribute to discussions on comparative corporate governance. 
On a glass half-full approach, one could even posit that the timing of this black swan 
event could not be better, as the arguments for both potential points on the Pareto fron-
tier can now be discussed adequately and frankly before significant transitionary costs 
are incurred as Japan (and many other economies) may be further shifting to a market-
based, shareholder-oriented model. After all, there is no universal method for economic 
efficiency, and much stems from strategies tailored to a countries’ current comparative 
institutional advantages.
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